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I. Introduction 
In our highly interconnected world, questions about court jurisdiction, the enforcement
of judgments, and applicable law now arise in every feld of endeavour and every walk of
life. Accordingly, just as with other members of the public, so too can members of the 
LGBTQ2+ community expect to be afected directly and indirectly by developments 
in the confict of laws. However, there are some implications of the confict of laws 
that have special signifcance for members of the LGBTQ2+ community in connection
with personal status and family relations. This chapter focuses on the issues arising in 
these areas. 
This chapter considers the issues afecting LGBTQ2+ persons in respect of mar-
riage, divorce, matrimonial property, adoption, custody, and support in cross-border 
situations. While this chapter aims to provide an indication of the key legal principles 
afecting LGBTQ2+ persons in these areas, it is important to bear in mind that the 
feld is developing rapidly, both domestically and across borders, and there remain 
many new and emerging issues that have yet to be addressed. 
II. Marriage 
A. Marriages and Other Unions in Canada 
The Parliament of Canada has the exclusive authority to make laws relating to marriage
and divorce.1 Accordingly, the cross-border issues relating to the validity of marriages 
arise primarily in the international context and not in the interprovincial context. 
1. Canadian Residents 
The law on celebrating marriages and other unions between same-sex couples has 
evolved considerably in Canada in recent times and it is now more advanced than the 
law in many other countries. Pursuant to the equality guarantees under section 15 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,2 in 2005, Parliament enacted the Civil 
Marriage Act3 to give same-sex couples equal access to marriage for civil purposes. 
1 Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, ss 91(26), 92(12)-(13). 
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c 11 [Charter]. 
3 SC 2005, c 33 [CMA]. The Act also preserves the freedom of members of religious groups
to hold and declare their religious beliefs, and the freedom of ofcials of religious groups to
refuse to perform marriages that are not in accordance with their religious beliefs; see Gérald
Goldstein and Jefrey Talpis, “Réfexions critiques sur l’avènement de l’union civile boiteuse
en droit international privé québéquois” (2003) 82 Can Bar Rev 1; Civil Code of Québec, art
3090.1, para 1 [CCQ ]. 
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Restricting same-sex couples to civil unions was insufcient to meet the constitutional
guarantee of equality.4 
The CMA provides that marriage, for civil purposes, is the lawful union of two 
persons to the exclusion of all others and that a marriage is not void or voidable by 
reason only that the spouses are of the same sex.5 
As a result of this legislative change, the validity of a marriage or other union celebrated
in some other country between couples of the same sex cannot be challenged on that 
basis alone in Canada. However, whether a same-sex marriage entered into in Canada 
will be recognized in other countries depends upon the law of the country in which 
recognition is sought.6 
2. Foreign Residents 
Historically, the legal restrictions on same-sex marriages could be regarded as afecting
the capacity of persons to marry. In traditional confict of laws analysis, this would be 
characterized as a question of the essential validity of the marriage. Such a characteriza-
tion could lead to the application of one or both of the couple’s antenuptial domiciles 
to determine whether those laws permitted them to marry.7 This could afect the 
recognition outside of Canada of the validity of an otherwise valid marriage that had 
been performed in Canada involving one or more persons domiciled elsewhere. 
Given the constitutional proscription on discrimination on the basis of sexual orien-
tation, there would seem to be no foundation for seeking a declaration of nullity in 
Canada of a same-sex marriage on the basis that one or both persons were domiciled 
in a country that did not permit them to enter into such a marriage. Indeed, many 
same-sex couples had been prompted by the legislation to come to Canada to marry 
because they were not permitted to do so in their home country. 
4 Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79. The term “same-sex” to describe relation-
ships is intended to include all relationships involving LGBTQ2+ persons. 
5 For discussion of the history of developments in the cross-border recognition of same-sex
marriages in Canada, see Donald J MacDougall, “Marriage Resolution and Recognition in
Canada” (1995) 29 Fam LQ 541; W Adams, “Same-Sex Relationships and Anglo-Canadian
Choice of Law: An Argument for Universal Validity” (1996) 34 Can YB Int’l Law 103;
Martha Bailey, “How Will Canada Respond to Same-Sex Marriage?” (1998) 32 Creighton
L Rev 105; Martha Bailey, “Hawaii’s Same-Sex Marriage Initiatives: Implications for Canada”
(1998) 15 Can J Fam L 153; Martha Bailey, “Beyond Sexuality: Same-Sex Relationships
Across Borders” (2004) 49 McGill LJ 1005. 
6 See e.g. Wilkinson v Kitzinger (No 2), [2006] EWHC 2022, in which the Family Division of
the English High Court denied the application of a same-sex couple for recognition of their
marriage to one another in British Columbia; Zappone & Anor v Revenue Commissioners &
Ors, [2006] IEHC 404, in which the High Court of Ireland declined to recognize a same-sex
couple’s marriage in British Columbia to be valid in Ireland. 
7 Schwebel v Ungar, 1963 CanlII 28 (Ont CA), af ’d [1965] SCR 148 [Schwebel ]. 
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Nevertheless, in response to a challenge to the Divorce Act8 restricting court juris-
diction to persons ordinarily resident in the province for one year, the attorney general
of Canada argued that the applicant couple was not validly married because the law of
their respective domiciles (United Kingdom and Florida) did not recognize their cap-
acity to marry one another.9 This prompted an amendment to the Civil Marriage Act 
to clarify that the lack of capacity under either spouse’s domicile to enter into a mar-
riage cannot invalidate an otherwise valid marriage celebrated in Canada.10 
B. Foreign Marriages and Other Unions 
1. Civil Unions in Places Where This Alone Is Permitted 
Generally, the issues concerning the validity of marriages and other unions that would
arise in Canada relate to the efect that is to be given in Canada to foreign marriages. 
As mentioned, it is unlikely that a marriage or other union entered into by a same-sex 
couple in another country will not be recognized as valid in Canada. However, ques-
tions may still arise as to the nature of the union that will be recognized. Couples who 
have chosen in other countries to enter into unions under legislative regimes equivalent
to marriage may be regarded in Canada as married for the purposes of the Divorce Act 
and provincial family law legislation.11 
This was illustrated in Hincks v Gallardo.12 A same-sex couple decided to move from
Canada to the United Kingdom where one of them had citizenship. They wished to 
formalize their relationship to enable the British citizen to sponsor the Canadian under
a civil partnership entry visa. The law in Britain did not have a provision for marriage 
between same-sex partners but the British Civil Partnership Act created a parallel regime
for same-sex partners.13 The parties entered into a civil partnership, and the Canadian
obtained a British national identity card, which identifed him as a “spouse/partner.”
He operated his Toronto business remotely but when it began to struggle, the couple 
relocated to Toronto. 
The couple’s relationship began to deteriorate, and when it ended, the Canadian 
brought an action for divorce, equalization of net family property, and spousal support.
The petition was resisted on the basis that the parties were never married because the 
British Civil Partnership Act specifcally stated that civil partnerships were not marriages
8 RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp). 
9 Application for Divorce of VM and LW (5 April 2011), Toronto Region, FS-11-367893 (Ont
Sup Ct J), Answer of the Attorney General (17 June 2011), Applicant Submissions (1 Sep-
tember 2005), Respondent Submissions (15 June 2007). 
10 CMA, s 5(1); Jan Jakob Bornheim, “Same-Sex Marriages in Canadian Private International
Law” (2013) 51 Alta L Rev 77. 
11 See e.g. the Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F 3 [FLA]. 
12 2013 ONSC 129 [Hincks]. 
13 Civil Partnership Act 2004 (UK), c 33 [CPA]. 
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in Britain. However, the Attorney General of Ontario intervened on behalf of the 
recognition of the relationship as one of “spouses.”14 The court concluded that the CPA
met all the statutory criteria of marriage as defned by Canada’s CMA. As the court 
explained, 
Their union is a lawful union under the laws of the UK. Their union is of two persons, 
to the exclusion of all others. In the simplest terms it meets the statutory defnition of
marriage in Canada. Because these parties could not marry in the UK, but had to enter 
into a civil partnership there instead, they have sufered discrimination on the basis of
their sexual orientation. 
In the particular circumstances of this civil partnership, where the parties were denied 
the choice to marry in the place where the union was celebrated I would perpetuate 
impermissible discrimination if I failed to recognize their civil partnership as a
marriage.15 
Accordingly, the parties were regarded as married and the marriage could therefore 
be dissolved. 
2. Marriages in Places Where Same-Sex Unions 
Are Not Permitted 
The issue in Hincks related to the interpretation to be given to a relationship equivalent
to a marriage where a civil partnership was permitted and where a marriage was not. 
A further question that arises and that has not yet been considered by the courts in 
Canada is the status of a marriage ceremony celebrated in a country in which it is not 
permitted for persons of the same sex to marry at all. This would entail a marriage that
was not ofcially recognized as valid in the place where it was celebrated. 
The formal validity of a marriage is usually governed by the lex loci celebrationis—the
law of the place where the marriage is celebrated. However, the confict of laws has 
long recognized the challenges faced by persons who wish to marry in places where it 
is not possible to comply with the local formalities. The impossibility may arise because
there is no local form, as, for example, in an unoccupied territory; because the local 
means for celebrating marriages has broken down in the course or the aftermath of
war; or because the local form is one with which the parties in question cannot conform
for legal or moral reasons.16 While the case law once contained illustrations of this in 
14 Hincks, supra note 12 at paras 68-80. 
15 Ibid at paras 83-84. 
16 C Davies, Family Law in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1984) cited in Lin (Re), 1992
CanLII 6225 at para 16 (Alta QB); Flores v Mendez, 2014 BCSC 951, in which parties par-
ticipated in a ceremony that, on its face, purported to cause them to be married but failed
because one of them was still married to his frst wife. 
324 LGBTQ2+ Law: Practice Issues and Analysis 
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situations of displaced persons17 and those living in places under belligerent
occupation,18 it has also occurred in situations in which the couple wishes to celebrate 
in a place that is convenient for their family and friends and yet believe that the ofcial 
marriage must be celebrated elsewhere.19 
Where a marriage that is invalid as to form is entered into for the purposes of facili-
tating a spousal relationship, spousal rights and obligations may accrue despite the 
formal invalidity of the marriage,20 but the rights and obligations accruing will depend 
upon whether in the circumstances the parties can be taken to have understood the 
ceremony to have created a valid marriage.21 The test enunciated by an English court 
is as follows: 
a. whether the ceremony or event set out or purported to be a lawful marriage; 
b. whether it bore all or enough of the hallmarks of marriage; 
c. whether the three key participants (most especially the ofciating ofcial) 
believed, intended and understood the ceremony as giving rise to the status of
lawful marriage; and 
d. the reasonable perceptions, understandings and beliefs of those in attendance.22 
Accordingly, it is possible, in principle, for a ceremony between same-sex partners 
intended to create a relationship of marriage to be held to be valid in Canada even if it 
was not ofcially recognized in the place where it was celebrated. Indeed, this would 
seem to be a logical extension of the reasoning in Hincks, in which the civil union was 
held to create a valid marriage.23 
In a slightly diferent context, the willingness of a court to disregard the potential 
for invalidation of a foreign marriage through the application of discriminatory laws 
was illustrated in MSC v CFJ,24 a case involving a Canadian man who was transgender
and who married an American woman in Texas. In Canada, a transgender person may 
17 Schwebel, supra note 7, involved a challenge to the validity of religious divorce performed
for a Hungarian couple in a displaced persons camp in Italy en route to Israel. 
18 Starkowski (otherwise Urbanski) v AG, [1954] AC 155 HL (Eng), concerning a religious mar-
riage performed in Austria during Nazi occupation. 
19 Hudson v Leigh, [2009] EWHC 1306 (Fam) (Eng) [Hudson], in which a couple celebrated a
large wedding in South Africa but decided to separate before the ofcial civil ceremony was
to take place in England, and the marriage was held to be invalid. 
20 Best v Best, 2015 NLTD(F) 23, af’d 2016 NLCA 68 [Best], in which a couple celebrated an
informal ceremony in Nepal in order to be regarded in Saudi Arabia as a married couple and
permitted to cohabitate. 
21 Best (CA), supra note 20. 
22 Hudson, supra note 19. 
23 Supra note 12 at para 84. 
24 2017 ONSC 2389 [MSC]. 
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obtain a birth certifcate and other government identifcation refecting the gender with
which that person identifes,25 but in some places, government documents must indicate
the person’s birth sex. In MSC, after the couple married, the Texas courts ruled that 
a person’s birth gender remained their legal gender for life, and Texas enacted legis-
lation prohibiting same-sex marriages. 
The husband wished to obtain a green card to work in Texas based on his marital 
status but thought that he could not do so because the application process required a 
full physical and medical examination, and the requirement to list all legal names that 
he had used, including the female name given to him at birth.26 He sought legal advice 
and was informed that Texas might regard his marriage as invalid. Later, he wished to 
divorce in Canada, which would require the Canadian court to recognize his marriage 
as valid even if it was not valid under the law in Texas. 
The Ontario Superior Court recognized the Texas marriage as valid because, 
(a) under Ontario law, the applicant was a male person at the time of the Texas marriage 
and thereafter, and accordingly the Texas marriage was a marriage of persons of the op-
posite gender which raised no issue of validity in any event; 
(b) even assuming that there was evidence as to the foreign law that established that the 
Texas marriage was void at the date of the Ontario marriage because the parties were 
considered a same-sex couple when they married in Texas, then under Ontario law, 
applying Hincks, it would be contrary to the express values of Canadian society, and also 
discriminatory, to refuse to recognize the Texas marriage as valid.27 
Accordingly, even if the Ontario court accepted that the marriage was invalid in the
place where it was celebrated, the court held that it would be contrary to the express 
values of Canadian society and also discriminatory to regard it as invalid in Canada. 
3. Civil Unions in Quebec 
The CCQ recognizes and gives efect to a civil union that is a “commitment by two 
persons 18 years of age or over who express their free and enlightened consent” to live
together and “to uphold the rights and obligations that derive from that status.”28 
Accordingly, in Quebec, couples who do not wish to marry, including same-sex couples,
may enter into a civil union. The CCQ provides that the essential and formal validity 
of civil unions is governed by the law of the place of solemnization.29 The law of the 
place of solemnization also applies to the efects of a civil union, except those binding 
25 XY v Ontario (Government and Consumer Services), 2012 HRTO 726. 
26 MSC, supra note 24 at para 13. 
27 MSC, supra note 24 at para 34. 
28 Art 521.1; see also arts 521.2-19. 
29 Art 3090.1. 
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all spouses regardless of the civil union regime, which are subject to the law of the 
country of domicile of the spouses. 
This corresponds with provisions in the CMA enabling same-sex couples not resi-
dent in Canada to marry and to divorce in Canada where this is not permitted in the 
country of their residence.30 Where a couple who are cohabiting have entered into an 
agreement regarding their respective rights during or following their cohabitation, 
their agreement will be subject to the rules of jurisdiction and choice of law discussed 
in Section IV, Matrimonial Property and Section VII, Support. 
III. Divorce 
A. Canadian Divorces 
Pursuant to section 4 of the CMA, a marriage is not void or voidable solely by reason 
of the fact that the spouses are of the same sex. Following the enactment of this legis-
lation, the defnition of “spouse” in the Divorce Act was amended to mean “either of
two persons who are married to each other.”31 These legislative changes clarify that 
the fact that the spouses are of the same sex cannot serve as a ground for a decree of
nullity and that divorce and corollary relief under the Divorce Act are available to same-
sex couples. 
Pursuant to the Divorce Act, a court in Canada has jurisdiction to hear and determine
a divorce proceeding if either spouse has been ordinarily resident in the forum province
for at least one year immediately preceding the commencement of the proceeding. 
The jurisdictional challenges faced by same-sex couples who maintain a peripatetic 
lifestyle are no diferent from those faced by other couples. However, as mentioned 
earlier, following the introduction of the CMA, many same-sex couples visited Canada
to marry because they were not capable of marrying under the law of their residence. 
Having then returned to reside in their country of origin, they would not meet the 
residential requirements in Canada under the Divorce Act to obtain a divorce. This caused
considerable difculty for same-sex couples who had been married in Canada and 
wished to end their marriage.32 
In response, the CMNRA amended the CMA to provide that all marriages per-
formed in Canada between non-residents, whether they are of the same sex or opposite
30 Civil Marriage of Non-Residents Act, SC 2013, c 32, ss 5, 7 [CMNRA]; JG Castel & ME
Castel, “The Marriage and Divorce in Canada of Non-Domiciled and Non-Resident Persons”
(2012) 31 Fam LQ 297; Bornheim, supra note 10; Brenda Cossman, “Exporting Same-Sex
Marriage, Importing Same-Sex Divorce—Or How Canada’s Marriage and Divorce Laws
Unleashed a Private International Law Nightmare and What to Do About It” (2013) 32 Can
Fam LQ 1. 
31 Divorce Act, s 2. 
32 Janet Walker, “Same-Sex Divorce Tourism Comes to Canada” (2012) Law Q Rev 344 at
344-46. 
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sex, that would be valid in Canada if the spouses were domiciled in Canada are valid 
for the purposes of Canadian law even if one or both of the non-residents did not, at 
the time of the marriage, have the capacity to enter into the marriage under the law of
their respective state of domicile. It also established a new divorce process that allows a
Canadian court to grant a divorce to non-resident spouses who reside in a state where 
a divorce cannot be granted to them because that state does not recognize the validity 
of their marriage.33 
B. Foreign Divorces 
Questions related to the recognition in Canada of foreign divorce decrees may arise
in various kinds of proceedings, including nullity suits, claims for spousal support, the
custody of children or a share in an estate, eforts to obtain a marriage licence, and 
prosecutions for bigamy. The questions facing same-sex couples in relation to the 
recognition of foreign divorces are largely the same as those facing all married persons.
Pursuant to the Divorce Act, a divorce granted by a foreign tribunal having jurisdiction 
to do so will be recognized for all purposes of determining the marital status in Canada
of any person provided proper notice was given to the respondent and the divorce was 
not obtained by fraud.34 
The availability of a divorce for a same-sex couple implies the recognition of their 
marriage. Accordingly, questions of the recognition in Canada of a divorce granted in 
another country are unlikely to raise issues specifc to LGBTQ2+ persons. Whether a 
divorce granted by a Canadian court in respect of a same-sex couple—and the corollary
relief that is granted as an incident to that divorce—will be recognized in another 
country would be determined by the law of that country. 
C. Canadian Nullity Decrees 
Canadian courts have exercised jurisdiction in nullity proceedings in the case of mar-
riages that were alleged to be void on the basis of the domicile or residence of both 
parties within the province; or, in some provinces, on the basis of the domicile or resi-
dence of either party within the province; or on the basis that the marriage was celebrated
within the province.35 The CCQ provides that a “Québec authority has jurisdiction in 
matters relating to the nullity of a marriage … when the domicile or place of residence 
33 Ibid. 
34 Powell v Cockburn, [1977] 2 SCR 218, concerning fraud going to jurisdiction. 
35 Re Capon, Capon and O’Brian v McLay, 1965 CanLII 197 (Ont CA); Savelief v Glouchkof, 
1964 CanLII 438 (BCCA); Grewal v Kaur, 2011 ONSC 1812, in which the husband sought
annulment when the wife immigrated to Canada to live with her family and not with him;
Whitaker v McNeilly (1957), 11 DLR (2d) 90 (BCSC); CMD v RRS, 2005 BCSC 757; MSC, 
supra note 24. 
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of one of the spouses or the place of the solemnization of their marriage is in Québec.”36 
In light of section 4 of the CMA, which provides that a marriage is not void or voidable
by reason only that the spouses are of the same sex, no special issues arise for 
LGBTQ2+ persons in respect of nullity decrees sought in Canada. 
D. Foreign Nullity Decrees 
Generally, a decree of nullity of a marriage pronounced by a foreign court of competent
jurisdiction will be recognized as binding and conclusive by Canadian courts provided 
that both parties were domiciled or resident in that jurisdiction or were domiciled in 
a state whose courts would recognize the decree, or the marriage was celebrated there.37 
Generally, the grounds on which a foreign decree of nullity of marriage is pronounced 
are irrelevant to its recognition. In Quebec, the provisions of the CCQ relating to the 
recognition and enforcement of foreign decisions apply to nullity decrees as well.38 
However, Canadian courts will not recognize a foreign decree of nullity of marriage
if it was obtained by fraud or in a manner contrary to natural or substantial justice, or 
if recognition would be contrary to Canadian public policy.39 Pursuant to the CMA 
provision that a marriage is not void or voidable by reason only that the spouses are of
the same sex, it would follow that a foreign decree of nullity granted solely because the
spouses were of the same sex would be denied recognition in a Canadian court. This 
was illustrated by the reasoning in the MSC decision in which the court held that 
even assuming that there was evidence as to the foreign law that established that the 
Texas marriage was void at the date of the Ontario marriage because the parties were 
considered a same-sex couple when they married in Texas, then under Ontario law, 
applying Hincks, it would be contrary to the express values of Canadian society, and also 
discriminatory, to refuse to recognize the Texas marriage as valid.40 
E. Declarations of Status 
Where a couple is resident in a Canadian province, the courts have jurisdiction to grant
a declaration as to the matrimonial status of the parties, even though no other relief is 
sought. The courts also have jurisdiction to grant a declaration as to the matrimonial 
status of the parties where this is incidental to a petition for divorce or an action for a 
declaration of nullity of marriage. In view of the evolving state of the law in many 
36 Art 3144. 
37 N Raferty, “Recognition of Foreign Nullity Decrees” (1982) 46 Sask L Rev 73. 
38 Arts 3155-60, 3164. 
39 Salvesen (or Von Lorang) v Administrator of Austrian Property, [1927] AC 641 at 652, 663,
671-72 HL (Eng); Merker v Merker, [1962] 3 All ER 928 at 934, 936 (Eng); Lepre v Lepre, 
[1963] 2 All ER 49 at 56-57. 
40 MSC, supra note 24 at para 34. 
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countries, couples may have reason to seek declarations as to their matrimonial status.
42The need for this was refected in both Hincks 41 and in MSC. 
The law that the court would ordinarily apply would be that arising from the nature
of the declaration sought, such as that of the validity of a foreign marriage or of a 
foreign divorce. However, in view of the constitutional underpinnings of the CMA, it 
would seem unlikely that the declaration granted would be inconsistent with section 
4 of the Act stating that a marriage is not void or voidable by reason only that the 
spouses are of the same sex. 
IV. Matrimonial Property 
A. Matrimonial Property in Same-Sex Relationships 
The law of matrimonial property in Canada has evolved to keep pace with changes in 
the law more generally on same-sex relationships. In 1999 in M v H, the Supreme Court
of Canada (SCC) held that a distinction between cohabiting heterosexual couples and 
cohabiting same-sex couples was an analogous ground under section 15(1) securing 
the Charter guarantee of equality between them.43 In light of the more recent changes 
to the law of marriage, it would appear that the law governing matrimonial property 
upon dissolution of either formal marriages or relationships of cohabitation would not 
give rise to any special considerations in cases of same-sex relationships.44 
Furthermore, provincial legislation recognizes the rights of same-sex couples to 
enter into cohabitation agreements in the same way as other couples. For example, 
section 53 of the Ontario FLA provides that 
two persons who are cohabiting or intend to cohabit and who are not married to each other
may enter into an agreement in which they agree on their respective rights and obligations
during cohabitation, or on ceasing to cohabit or on death, including … ownership in or 
division of property. 
The absence of any qualifcation as to the gender of the persons clarifes that there is 
no legal distinction to be drawn between heterosexual and same-sex relationships. 
This is diferent from the approach that is taken in other countries, notably those 
countries in which same-sex marriages are not permitted and especially in those coun-
tries in which same-sex relationships are discriminated against.45 
41 Hincks, supra note 12. 
42 MSC, supra note 24. 
43 [1999] 2 SCR 3. 
44 See e.g. Ruskin v Dewar, 2005 SKCA 89, considering disposition of the property of a same-
sex couple following the termination of their common law relationship. 
45 See Section IV.B for a discussion of Droit de la famille—102375, 2010 QCCS 4390. 
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B. Applicable Law 
The main question that arises for same-sex couples in proceedings involving determi-
nations of matrimonial property, then, is whether the law of a province of Canada or 
a foreign law should apply. The Uniform Jurisdiction and Choice of Law Rules in Domestic
Property Proceedings Act 46 provides that the proper law of the relationship is the internal
law of the jurisdiction in which the spouses had their most recent common habitual 
residence.47 Where this jurisdiction is outside Canada and is not the jurisdiction most 
closely associated with the relationship between the spouses, the proper law is the internal
law of the jurisdiction that is most closely associated with the relationship between 
the spouses.48 
Although the question has yet to be considered in the context of the rights of same-
sex couples, the choice of law determination for matrimonial property has been held 
to be subject to considerations of public policy. In Vladi v Vladi,49 the Nova Scotia 
Supreme Court was asked to determine which law governed the disposition of matri-
monial property between a couple who were Iranian nationals and whose last common
habitual residence was in West Germany. On considering the application of the law of
West Germany (as it then was), it was argued that if the matter were tried in West 
Germany, the court might give efect to Iranian matrimonial law under which Mrs Vladi
would receive only a symbolic or token gift. 
This result was viewed as “archaic and repugnant to ideas of substantial justice in 
the province” and was rejected.50 Accordingly, it may be suggested that where the 
prescribed choice of law analysis leads to the application of a law that is archaic and 
repugnant to ideas of substantial justice in the province by reason of its discrimination 
against LGBTQ2+ persons, the result might be rejected in favour of one that accorded
equality to the relationship. 
46 Uniform Law Conference of Canada, online: <https://www.ulcc.ca/en/home/482-josetta
-1-en-gb/uniform-actsa/jurisdictionchoice-of-law-rules-in-domestic-prope/308-jurisdiction
-and-choice-of-law-rules-in-domestic-property-proceedings-act/> [Uniform Act]. The
Uniform Law Conference of Canada promulgates uniform legislation that may be adopted
by the provinces. 
47 Uniform Act, s 8(1); Parker v Mitchell, 2016 BCSC 723, in which the court found that al-
though parties regularly spent summers in British Columbia, they lived together in California
and separated during a period when they were living in California, and so California law
governed the matrimonial property claim. 
48 Uniform Act, s 8(2). 
49 (1987), 79 NSR (2d) 356. 
50 Ibid at para 30. 
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V. Adoption and Parentage 
A. Legitimacy 
At one time, only children born to parents validly married were deemed “legitimate”
in law. But today provincial legislation51 provides that a child is the child of his or her 
parents and there is a presumption in respect of a child conceived through sexual 
intercourse that a person is the parent if any of the following situations apply: 
1. The person was the birth parent’s spouse at the time of the child’s birth. 
2. The person was married to the child’s birth parent by a marriage that was termin-
ated by death or judgment of nullity within 300 days before the child’s birth or by 
divorce where the judgment of divorce was granted within 300 days before the 
child’s birth. 
3. The person was living in a conjugal relationship with the child’s birth parent before
the child’s birth and the child is born within 300 days after they cease to live in a 
conjugal relationship. 
4. The person has certifed the child’s birth, as a parent of the child, under the Vital 
Statistics Act or a similar Act in another jurisdiction in Canada. 
5. The person has been found or recognized by a court of competent jurisdiction 
outside Ontario to be a parent of the child.52 
These presumptions are not gender specifc. 
Historically, legitimacy could afect a child’s domicile of origin, citizenship and 
immigration rights, as well as guardianship claims. However, the most common issue 
afected was the right to succession. Until recently, a bequest to an unnamed “child”
meant a “legitimate child” unless the will stated otherwise; and intestate succession 
also depended upon the claimant’s legitimacy. Alberta and Nova Scotia have legislation
providing for the recognition of legitimation by the subsequent marriage of the child’s 
parents.53 The statutes provide that in the requisite circumstances, the child is legitimate
from birth for all purposes of the law of the province; and in the case of Nova Scotia, 
the statute specifes this to include the right to inherit property upon an intestacy. 
To the extent that a child’s legitimacy is determined by the validity of the child’s 
parents’ marriage in Canada or elsewhere, all the cross-border issues afecting the 
validity of marriages could have implications for the rights of the children of those 
unions. Accordingly, for example, the marriage of a same-sex couple could create
51 See e.g. Children’s Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C.12, s 4(1) [CLRA]. 
52 CLRA, s 7(2). 
53 Legitimacy Act, RSA 2000, c L-10, s 1; Maintenance and Custody Act, RSNS 1989, c 160,
ss 47-50. 
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rights of citizenship and succession for the child, and custody and support for the 
parents. So, too, could the recognition of the parent’s status as married create such 
rights. Whether rights such as these existing under the law in Canada would be rec-
ognized under the law of another country would depend on the law of that country. 
B. Adoptions, Surrogacy, and Declarations of Parentage 
The law relating to adoptions and surrogacy in Canada is, in principle, no diferent for 
LGBTQ2+ persons from the law as it applies to non-LGBTQ2+ persons except where
the law of another country applies to some aspect of the parental relationship and that 
law places restrictions on the permissibility of adoption or surrogacy for LGBTQ2+ 
persons.54 
In Canada, there are no legal prohibitions to adoption by same-sex couples. Joint 
adoption by same-sex couples is permitted by law in 26 countries, and step-adoption 
is permitted in a number of other countries. However, very few countries permit inter-
national adoptions by same-sex couples. Accordingly, while there may be few formal 
barriers to adoptions within Canada, confronted with the challenges of fnding a child 
for adoption in Canada, same-sex couples may turn to the possibility of adopting else-
where; and, confronted with the legal challenges of international adoption,55 they may 
then consider the possibility of surrogate parenting. 
For the LGBTQ2+ community, this raises two questions: First, where the couple 
have used a sperm donor or a surrogate to have a child, should it be necessary to apply 
for formal recognition of the couple’s status as parents, for example by adoption? And 
second, where the couple have had a child in another country with the assistance of a 
surrogate, may they adopt the child in Canada, or obtain a declaration of their par-
entage, so as to provide them with certainty of their status as parents? 
Adoption and declarations of the status of children can have a variety of implica-
tions for the rights and obligations of the persons afected. For example, ofcial rec-
ognition of a person’s status as the parent of a particular child may carry with it certain
presumptions of rights of access and of involvement in the life of the child and certain 
presumptions of responsibilities for support. Where a child’s parentage is in doubt,
a declaration may serve both to establish the parental rights and responsibilities of
one person and to limit the rights and responsibilities of another. The forum that is 
54 See e.g. Malcolm Dort, “Unheard Voices: Adoption Narratives of Same-Sex Male Couples”
(2010) 26 Can J Fam L 289. 
55 See David C Bell, “The Ironic Twist and International Adoption: Same-Sex Couples and
International Adoption Challenges” (2012) 12 Whittier J of Child & Family Advocacy 151;
Lynn D Wardle, “The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption and American Imple-
menting Law: Implications for International Adoptions by Gay and Lesbian Couples or
Partners” (2008) 18:1 Ind Intl & Comp L Rev 113. 









     
 
     
   










        
Copyright © 2020 Emond Montgomery Publications. All Rights Reserved. 
appropriate for determining a child’s parentage may vary depending on whose interests
are likely to be afected.56 
Certainty of parental status has been available in Ontario for some years but, until 
recently, only through a formal application either to adopt or obtain a declaration of
parentage. In one example in 2014, where a gay couple had used a surrogate and donor
eggs to conceive a child, they sought and obtained a declaration of parentage.57 While 
it happened that one of the applicants was the only one of the three parties to have a 
biological relationship with the child, it is not clear whether this was a factor in the 
ruling. Fortunately, at least in Ontario, it is no longer necessary for same-sex couples 
who have children to adopt them or to obtain a formal declaration of parentage in order
to have ofcial recognition of their status as parents. Since the passage of the All 
Families Are Equal Act, 2016,58 couples, including same-sex couples, who use sperm 
donors or a surrogate are legally recognized as parents without the need to adopt. 
C. Foreign Declarations of Status 
Turning to the issues of intercountry adoption,59 provincial legislation governing the 
recognition of foreign adoptions and the efect to be given to them within the province60 
generally provides that an adoption made according to the law of any other jurisdiction
that is substantially similar in efect to a domestic adoption shall be recognized and 
shall have the same efect in the province as a domestic adoption.61 
56 Olney v Rainville, 2010 BCCA 155, in which a mother, domiciled in British Columbia sought
a declaration that her current husband and not her previous husband, domiciled in Quebec,
was the natural father of their child and the court found that Quebec was the more appropri-
ate forum. 
57 AWM v TNS, 2014 ONSC 5420. 
58 SO 2016, c 23. 
59 Although immigration and citizenship is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is worth noting
that the challenges faced by surrogate parents in beneftting from the citizenship rights of
other parents of children born outside Canada has been considered in Stefanie Carsley,
“DNA, Donor Ofspring and Derivative Citizenship: Redefning Parentage Under the Cit-
izenship Act” (2016) 39 Dal LJ 525. See Chapter 10, Immigration for further discussion on
LGBTQ2+ issues and immigration. 
60 This is based on the Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Protection
of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, CTS 1997/12 (1993) 32 ILM
1134, online: (pdf ) <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/77e12f23-d3dc-4851-8f0b-050f71a16947
.pdf>; see Vaughan Black, “GATT for Kids: New Rules for Intercountry Adoption of Children”
(1995) 11 CFLQ 253; Peter Pfund, “Intercountry Adoption: The 1993 Hague Convention:
Its Purpose, Implementation and Promise” in Special Issue on International Family Law (1994)
28 Fam LQ 53. 
61 See e.g. Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, SO 2017, c 14, Schedule 1, s 218. 
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In Quebec, the CCQ rules that apply to fliation are equally applicable to the estab-
lishment of parentage. Since the CCQ permits same-sex parents to have children, a 
court may homologate a foreign order declaring the paternity of two men of a child 
born of a surrogate mother.62 This was illustrated in an application by two men for 
recognition of a Pennsylvania judgment declaring that they were the parents of a child 
yet to be born and asking that the Registrar of Civil Status issue a birth certifcate for 
the child or insert the American birth certifcate in the Quebec civil status registry as 
though it had been drawn up in Quebec, with the applicants as fathers.63 
The application was opposed by the attorney general of Quebec on the basis that 
this would be tantamount to endorsing a mode of fliation that was not recognized in 
the CCQ.64 The applicants were Canadian residents, but the child was born to an Amer-
ican resident surrogate mother, who was joined as a third party.65 The applicants argued
that the best interests of the child must prevail, and the court agreed that it should 
grant the order because it was not being asked to apply a foreign law to declare the 
couple’s parentage but merely to recognize the order of a foreign court duly declaring 
the child’s status.66 
In matters of fliation, the law applied in Quebec is that of the domicile or nationality
of the child or of one of the child’s parents at the time of the child’s birth, whichever 
is more benefcial to the child.67 It is submitted that the assessment of the best interests
of the child in making this determination is likely to be infuenced by the constitutional
support given in Canada for non-discriminatory treatment of LGBTQ2+ persons, for 
example, as refected in the rights of same-sex couples to be parents. 
VI. Custody 
As with a number of the previous sections, the law in Canada with regard to inter-
provincial custody matters involving LGBTQ2+ persons is similar to that for other 
persons. It is only with respect to international custody matters that special consider-
ations have emerged. Two main areas of the law have given rise to concerns for 
LGBTQ2+ persons. 
62 Droit de la famille—151172, 2015 QCCS 2308, applying arts 3166 and 115 of the CCQ. 
63 Ibid at paras 1-4. 
64 Ibid at para 5. 
65 Ibid at para 7. 
66 Ibid at para 96. 
67 CCQ , art 3091. 
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A. Custody Rights of Couples Residing Elsewhere 
Courtney v Springfeld 68 relates to the rights of LGBTQ2+ parents under The Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction69 and, in particular, the 
rights of parents where their marital relationship and their parental relationship is not 
ofcially acknowledged as one giving rise to custody rights under the Hague Conven-
tion. Pursuant to article 8 of the Hague Convention, a court in a contracting state upon
a request from another contracting state must ensure the prompt return of a child 
wrongfully removed or retained in breach of rights of custody or access. 
A court hearing a request for the return of the child does not make a custody de-
termination, but the wrongfulness of the removal of the child depends upon a fnding 
that the applicant had custody rights and was exercising them at the time removal. 
Accordingly, the application of the Hague Convention depends upon the recognition 
of custody rights, which may be complicated where a couple’s relationship does not 
have the same degree of ofcial recognition that it has in Canada. 
In Courtney, the Ontario Superior Court considered custody rights in the context 
of the application of the Hague Convention to a same-sex couple residing in England.70 
The parties had cohabited for nine years in England where they were approved as foster
carers and in whose care were placed two children who had medical problems. The 
applicable law did not permit same-sex parents to jointly adopt a child and, accordingly,
the respondent alone adopted the children.71 
When the couple separated, a joint residence order ( JRO) was issued prohibiting 
the removal of one of the children from the United Kingdom without the written 
consent of every person with “parental responsibility.”72 The respondent relocated to
Canada with the children without the consent of the applicant. The ofcial solicitor 
with administrative responsibility for the Lord Chancellor’s International Child Abduc-
tion and Contact Unit provided an opinion that the applicant had “inchoate rights of
custody.”73 The respondent conceded the JRO had the legal efect of conferring rights
of custody on the applicant that were actually being exercised at the relevant time.74 
Accordingly, the Hague Convention applied and the application was granted.75 
68 Courtney v Springfeld, 2008 CanLII 35920 (Ont Sup Ct J) [Courtney]. 
69 The Hague Conference on Private International Law, Collection of Conventions (1951-1980), 
1983 CTS 35 XXVIII at 264, online (pdf ): <https://assets.hcch.net/docs/e86d9f72-dc8d
-46f3-b3bf-e102911c8532.pdf> [the Hague Convention]. 
70 Courtney, supra note 68. 
71 Ibid at paras 2-7. 
72 Ibid at para 3. 
73 Ibid at paras 1, 21-24. 
74 Ibid at para 10. 
75 Ibid at paras 77-80. 
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B. Responding to Foreign Discrimination Against 
LGBTQ2+ Parents 
Droit de la famille—102375 76 also relates to the rights of LGBTQ2+ parents under
the Hague Convention, but in this case, the issues related to a request to return a child 
to an environment in which the respondent, the child’s mother, was discriminated 
against by reason of her sexual orientation. 
In this case, the Quebec Superior Court heard an application by a Mexican national,
the child’s father, for the return of the parties’ fve-year-old daughter. The child had 
been born in Mexico but had been brought to Quebec at the age of three by her mother
when she fed Mexico and claimed refugee status in Canada. The mother, who was a 
lesbian, alleged acts of conjugal violence against her by the father, and discrimination 
in Mexico against homosexuals. The father had sued for divorce in Mexico.77 Due to 
lack of assistance from the authorities and concerns that the father would take the child
from her, the mother had moved from her home state. She had gone into hiding in Mexico
before leaving for Canada. The family court judge in Mexico awarded custody of the 
child to the father on the basis of the mother’s sexual orientation, and a Mexican crim-
inal court found the mother guilty of the corruption and exploitation of a minor.78 
In response to the Hague Convention application, the mother argued that the child
had become settled in her new environment over the intervening 23 months. In addi-
tion, the mother argued that to return the child to Mexico would be contrary to her 
human rights and freedoms recognized in Quebec and would expose the child to 
psychological harm.79 The Quebec court agreed that the mother had been discriminated
against by the Mexican courts because of her sexual orientation and that there was a 
grave risk of incarceration for the mother if she returned with the child to Mexico. As 
a result, there was a clear and grave risk that ordering the child to be returned would 
expose the child to psychological or emotional harm or otherwise place her in an intoler-
able situation. The court therefore refused the application for the child’s return.80 
VII. Support 
An application for an order requiring a spouse to pay for the support of the other spouse
and of any or all of the children of the marriage may be made as corollary relief in a 
proceeding under the Divorce Act81 or as an application under provincial legislation.82 
76 Droit de la famille—102375, supra note 45. 
77 Ibid at paras 2-5, 11, 20-22. 
78 Ibid at paras 33, 42, 53. 
79 Ibid at paras 76-79. 
80 Ibid at paras 209, 218-21, 233. 
81 Sections 4, 15.1(1), 15.2(1), 15.3(1). 
82 See e.g. FLA, Part III, ss 29-50. 
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Applications for support involving parents who reside in diferent jurisdictions are 
facilitated by the interjurisdictional support orders legislation of the various provinces.83 
It does not appear that the courts have addressed issues of support as they might par-
ticularly afect LGBTQ2+ persons, but certain issues may be anticipated as of relevance
to members of the LGBTQ2+ community. 
A. Following Foreign Divorces 
The Divorce Act does not authorize a Canadian court to grant corollary relief in respect
of a foreign divorce decree84 or to vary the corollary relief granted by a foreign court 
in the course of granting a divorce,85 although a Canadian court may do so pursuant 
to provincial legislation for interjurisdictional support where the respondent resides 
in a reciprocating jurisdiction.86 Accordingly, where a divorce has been granted to a 
couple in a country where an application for an award for support has been afected by
discrimination against LGBTQ2+ persons, it would be necessary to apply under the 
provincial legislation and not the Divorce Act to vary the award. It should also be noted 
that the Divorce Act does not permit foreign courts to vary orders made under it.87 
Accordingly, eforts to alter a support order issued in Canada under the Divorce Act in 
order to refect the law of another country that discriminated against LGBTQ2+ 
persons would not be recognized in Canada. 
B. Applicable Law 
In a world in which the rights of same-sex couples—as between one another and as 
parents—are often not given treatment equal to other couples, the law governing an 
application for support on behalf of a spouse or a child is of particular importance. 
83 See e.g. Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002, SO 2002, c 13 [ISOA]. 
84 Wlodarczyk v Sprigs, 2000 SKQB 468; Jahangiri-Mavaneh v Taheri-Zengekani, 2003 CanLII
1962 (Ont Sup Ct J) [Jahangiri-Mavaneh]; Virani v Virani, 2006 BCCA 63 [Virani]. 
85 Rothgiesser v Rothgiesser, 2000 CanLII 1153 (Ont CA); Mercieca v Mercieca, 2002 CanLII 2754
(Ont Sup Ct J), fnding no power to vary relief granted in Texas divorce; Jahangiri-Mavaneh, 
supra note 84; Domise v Oyadiran, 2006 CanLII 2614 (Ont Sup Ct J), fnding no power to
challenge or vary support order in a Michigan divorce; Dashtarai v Shahrestani, [2006] OJ
No 5367 (QL) (Sup Ct J (Fam Ct)), fnding no power to vary relief granted in Iranian divorce;
Virani, supra note 84; Leonard v Booker, 2007 NBCA 71, fnding restriction applies even
where the parties reside in the province and consent to the court’s jurisdiction. 
86 H (JC) v H (MB), 2006 BCPC 76; Virani, supra note 84, in which the court lacked jurisdic-
tion to vary support granted in foreign divorce where respondent’s residence was not a
reciprocating jurisdiction; Cheng v Liu, 2017 ONCA 104, in which the respondent, having
obtained a stay in favour of the Chinese courts where the petitioner and child resided, failed
to make the fnancial disclosure necessary for the Chinese court to determine support and
matrimonial property division. The court found there was no longer jurisdiction under the
Divorce Act, but jurisdiction existed under the FLA for corollary relief. 
87 Darel v Darel, 1999 ABQB 881. 
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There is assurance of equality within Canada, in that a court making an order pursuant
to the Divorce Act applies the lex fori, which, due to the requirements for judicial juris-
diction, will be the law of residence of one or both spouses. Moreover, the application 
of the Federal Child Support Guidelines 88 would appear to be mandatory even where 
both parties have ceased to be resident in Canada at the time of determining support 
pursuant to a divorce in a Canadian court.89 
In the case of provincial interjurisdictional support legislation, the law governing 
support may be an important threshold issue afecting the entitlement to support. 
Pursuant to the legislation, in a claim for child support, the court frst considers the 
law of the place where the child resides in determining the child’s basic entitlement, 
including any arrears that might have accrued.90 However, if the child is not entitled 
to support under that law, the court may apply its own law.91 
In determining the amount of support, the courts are directed to apply the law of
the payer’s residence.92 However, even where a separation agreement provides for the
application of foreign law under which support obligations are less than those under 
the Guidelines, the Guidelines may prevail.93 
Where the application is for spousal support, the court frst applies its own law, but 
if there is no entitlement under that law, the court applies the law of the jurisdiction 
in which the parties last maintained a common habitual residence. In determining the 
amount of support, the court applies its own law. 
In either situation, it is clear from the case law that, particularly in respect of child 
support, the courts will readily depart from the law of the payer’s residence both in 
terms of entitlement and in terms of quantum where the result departs signifcantly 
from the award that would be granted under Canadian law.94 
88 SOR/97-175, s 3 [Guidelines]. 
89 Hughes v Alfano, 2006 BCSC 109, where the parties and their children had moved to England
by the time child support was determined. 
90 See e.g ISOA ss 13, 35; Baugh v Samuels, 2001 CanlII 32833 (Ont Ct J); Mathusz v Carew, 
2011 NLTD(F) 28, in which the entitlement of child to support was determined in accordance
with foreign law; Sheehan v Sheehan, 2011 NLTD(F) 43, in which the law of Massachusetts
applied; Stewart v Stewart Estate, 2011 BCSC 774, in which the law of Mississippi provided
that the obligation to maintain life insurance with a child as a benefciary ended when the
child reached age of majority. 
91 AG v LS, 2006 ABCA 311, where a support order from Kazakhstan was uncertain and parties
were required to make submissions on appropriate quantum of support. 
92 See e.g ISOA s 35; Mathers v Bruce, 2005 BCCA 410. 
93 Blagaich v Blagaich, 2007 CanLII 37352 (Ont Sup Ct J). 
94 Hastings v Deakin, 2014 ONCJ 618, in which the court refused recognition of a variation
obtained in the payee’s jurisdiction based on its law, as contrary to public policy; de Somer
v Martin, 2012 ONCA 535, fnding that a foreign order for a variation may be rejected, par-
ticularly where the applicant has evidently chosen a jurisdiction to bring a variation application 
in order to minimize the payment obligation. 
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PERSONAL REFLECTION 
THE STRUGGLE FOR LGBTQ2+ FAMILIES TO BE 
RECOGNIZED IN CANADA 
Robynne B Kazina 
Society changes more quickly than legislation. As a result, legislation often 
lags behind and fails to address the current realities of Canadian society. 
Such is the case with assisted reproduction, where legislation is based on 
outdated assumptions and is discriminatory towards individuals in same-
sex relationships with respect to their reproductive options, marital status, and
recognition of parenthood. There is a lack of consistency in how the various 
governments regulate these issues. Some provinces (British Columbia and, 
recently, Ontario) have made strides to meet these new challenges, while 
others (Manitoba, notably) are behind. 
Let me illustrate this with the stories of three couples who have had to 
navigate their ways through the miasma of uncertainty that our current lack 
of comprehensive and consistent legislation has created. 
Susan and Mary were a common law couple who wanted to have a child 
and both be listed as the child’s parents on the initial birth registration, as 
would any couple. In Manitoba, however, this is complicated because of dis-
criminatory provisions of The Vital Statistics Act.95 In Manitoba, those in a 
lesbian common law couple can only both be registered as the parents of 
their child if they used artifcial insemination (AI), which—as defned by the 
province—is the direct insertion of sperm into the mother’s womb only. 
However, like many couples, Susan and Mary attempted AI without success 
and had to use in vitro fertilization (IVF) to achieve a pregnancy. 
In Manitoba, same-sex couples are treated diferently depending on their 
marital status. Whereas heterosexual couples enjoy the beneft of being able 
to both be registered as parents regardless of how they conceived or whether
they are common law or married, same-sex couples do not have those same 
rights under current law. Married, same-sex couples in Manitoba who choose
IVF or frozen embryo transfer can register the non-birthing woman as a 
parent; common law same-sex couples cannot. The non-birthing woman in 
a common-law relationship must apply for a court order for parentage to be 
registered. This defnes lesbian women as somehow less legitimate parents 
than the birth mother or other parents, and it denies them the ability to 
make medical care decisions on their child’s behalf immediately after the 
birth. It also adds concomitant stress, uncertainty, delay, and expense. 
Susan and Mary discovered that Manitoba would not recognize their 
desired family structure, and like many same-sex couples, they responded 
95 CCSM, c V60 [VSA]. 
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to this by getting married to meet the requirements of the VSA. A couple’s 
choice to marry or not should not be obstructed by heteronormative legisla-
tion that diminishes or restricts their freedom of choice in family structure. 
Mark and Ben, our second couple, faced a diferent obstacle common to 
gay men: limited access to a surrogate. The federal Assisted Human Repro-
duction Act96 makes it a criminal ofence, with a penalty of up to ten years in 
jail or a fne of $500,000, to provide a surrogate with any compensation other
than reimbursement for receipted, out-of-pocket expenses. With these crim-
inal prohibitions there are a limited number of surrogates available in 
Canada, and the demand for surrogates is growing. In the United States, the 
states control surrogacy law, leading to a spectrum from commercialized 
surrogacy in some states to an outright ban of surrogacy in others. This 
results in Canadians turning to the United States to fnd a surrogate in states
where compensation leads to more surrogates being available. The barriers 
to gay men in being able to fnd a surrogate in Canada would be mitigated 
if the criminalization of surrogacy in the AHRA was removed, leaving each 
province the responsibility to regulate the practice. 
Mark and Ben had difculty being matched with a surrogate through the 
Canadian agencies because of the limited availability of surrogates and their 
own complicated circumstances. What complicated their case is that Mark 
and Ben only wanted to acknowledge Mark as the father. Mark’s family lives 
in China and would refuse to accept him were they to discover that he is gay. 
The men wanted their son to attend a particular summer school in China, 
which would have required Mark’s parents to have their grandchild’s birth 
certifcate to facilitate that attendance. The birth certifcate, of course, would 
have outed Mark and made this arrangement unlikely, if not impossible. 
After failing to match with a surrogate through Canadian surrogacy 
agencies, Mark and Ben turned their search to the United States. They were 
able to fnd a surrogate through an American agency but found that they 
could not aford the fees. They told me that they were considering working 
with the surrogate outside of the agency but I advised them against this as 
it would mean the surrogate would be in breach of her contract with the 
agency and was not a viable option for them. 
Mark and Ben took up their search in Canada again and were ecstatic 
when they called me to say that they had found “a friend of a friend” as a 
surrogate. Further discussion unveiled some red fags, however. The pro-
spective surrogate did not have care or any contact with her own young 
children and had told the couple that she wanted to be a surrogate because 
she “liked the attention she received when she was pregnant.” I encouraged 
them to see a counsellor for some screening. As I suspected, the counsellor 
recommended they not proceed with the prospective surrogate. 
96 SC 2004, c 2 [AHRA]. 
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All of these disappointments did not deter them, and they continued to 
work with Canadian agencies. After a lengthy search, they found a suitable 
surrogate. Mark and Ben are now proud parents. 
Surrogate scarcity is not the only obstacle to making a happy family. The 
provinces vary widely in how they recognize parentage; some are more 
“surrogate-friendly” than others. Our third couple, Rob and Chris, discov-
ered some of the drawbacks to this inconsistency among the provinces. 
I represented Rob and Chris, who are from Saskatchewan, in their rela-
tionship with Anna, a surrogate from Manitoba. Anna had already gone 
through two failed transfer attempts and a miscarriage before fnally becom-
ing pregnant. Because of the uncertainty of both men being listed as 
parents in Manitoba, they considered having Anna travel from Winnipeg to 
Kenora, Ontario (a two-and-a-half-hour drive on a highway with a high inci-
dence of fatal accidents) to give birth in a friendlier parentage regime. 
Having surrogates travel to a diferent province to give birth, unfortu-
nately, is not an uncommon practice. When compiling a birth plan, a preg-
nant person should be deciding things such as the use of an epidural or 
doula, not which province to travel to for the birth. Anna’s prenatal care was 
provided by her Manitoba midwife, who would have had to stay in a hotel in 
Kenora, possibly for a month, and would not have been allowed to assist
in the birth in Ontario. Kenora, which has a smaller birthing centre than 
Winnipeg, has no maternity ward or neonatal intensive care unit—no small 
matter considering Anna’s history. Airlines often do not permit pregnant 
people to fy after 36 weeks. So the only option for Anna, and others like her, 
at that point was to travel by car and wait for the delivery without having 
familiar surroundings and the support of their family and friends. 
Rob and Chris weighed the extra expense (both fnancial and psycho-
logical) and the extra risk, and chose to have Anna give birth to their child in 
Manitoba, despite the difculties of establishing their parenthood. 
As we can see, Canada and the provinces still have a way to go to meet 
the needs of all their citizens. Rationalizing the defnitions and protocols for 
parenthood for LGBTQ2+ couples and easing some of the restrictions on 
surrogacy would go a long way to including families as they are currently 
evolving. We need to advocate as lawyers, as citizens, and as voters to make 
this progress happen. 
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PERSONAL REFLECTION 
PARTICIPATING IN LGBTQ2+ EQUALITY LITIGATION:
A RESEARCHER’S PERSPECTIVE 
Lori E Ross 
I think it’s fair to say that most academics choose this career because we 
hope to make a diference in the world. We quickly learn, though, that there 
is no direct path between the research we produce and policy change; 
indeed, in my experience, it has been rare to directly infuence policy. 
Having the opportunity to participate as an expert witness in LGBTQ2+ 
equality litigation related to birth registration taught me a great deal about 
the role that researchers can play in the policy-making process. 
I fnd John Kingdon’s multiple streams model97 to be a helpful frame-
work in conceptualizing the role of research in the policy-making process. 
Kingdon argues that three separate “streams” operate in parallel to infuence
public policy-making: the “problem recognition stream,” where attention is 
brought to a policy problem; the “policy stream,” where a policy solution to 
the problem becomes available; and “the political stream,” where policy-
makers have both the opportunity and the motive to turn the solution into 
policy. Only when these three streams come together does a “policy window”
open to enable change. 
As a researcher, I see an important role for my work in the problem rec-
ognition stream in drawing attention to inequities faced by LGBTQ2+
people through producing knowledge about their experiences. I do this by 
researching the various sites of discrimination for LGBTQ2+ people, including
policy-regulated processes such as birth registration. Research participants 
share with me their experiences of discrimination, as well as the impact of 
those experiences on their lives; I then have the role of demonstrating how 
social systems and structures operate to produce those discriminatory ex-
periences. At the same time, my work can also contribute to the policy 
stream by soliciting ideas from LGBTQ2+ people and other stakeholders 
about potential solutions to inequities. In almost all of my research studies, 
we ask our participants directly what they would recommend to decision-
makers who have infuence over the particular systems they are afected by. 
By documenting the experiences of LGBTQ2+ people, as well as their rec-
ommendations for change, and disseminating this information through 
various academic and non-academic venues, I work to raise awareness 
among policy-makers and the voting public about policy problems and 
potential solutions. 
97 John W Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, 2nd ed (Boston; Montreal:
Longman, 2011). 
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My involvement in LGBTQ2+ equality litigation related to birth registra-
tion was an example of the multiple streams model in action. Here are a few 
of the things that I learned through the process. 
A. It Helps to Know the Right People 
Although researchers have the tools to document policy problems, we are 
often not well placed to know which problems most need to be docu-
mented. I’ve been privileged to work alongside community advocates and 
activists in my research with LGBTQ2+ people who have shared insider 
knowledge with me and thus directed my research in important ways. 
Through these partnerships, I’ve built relationships that help me to be “in 
the know” when possible litigation is brewing, or when there are equity-
related issues that could beneft from some research attention in order to 
push issues forward on the policy-making agenda. In the case of LGBTQ2+ 
birth registration, my long-standing partnership with Rachel Epstein (former 
coordinator of the LGBTQ Parenting Network) created opportunities for me 
to share my relevant research toward problem recognition. Although I’ve 
always been committed to working in partnership with communities to 
achieve more equitable production of knowledge, I now also appreciate that 
working in partnership with communities is a key facilitator for research
to infuence policy. Building these reciprocal relationships enables me to 
address community-relevant research priorities proactively, in order to have 
data to contribute to problem recognition when the time comes for a policy 
window to open. 
B. Be Patient 
After having had the opportunity to participate in two rounds of LGBTQ2+ 
equality litigation related to birth registration, I appreciate that change is 
slow and happens in bits and pieces; policy windows can open and close 
multiple times in the course of policy change. When I was frst asked to 
contribute as an expert witness to Rutherford v Ontario (Deputy Registrar 
General),98 I prepared an afdavit based on data from a study I had recently 
conducted with non-biological mothers of young children regarding the 
stress they experienced as a result of their lack of legal recognition as 
parents. Although the changes to arise from Rutherford were positive, they 
were incomplete, leaving out many members of the LGBTQ2+ community. 
When, ten years later, I was asked to contribute to Grand v Ontario (Attorney 
General),99 I was struck to fnd that I could prepare a much thicker afdavit, 
now based on numerous studies with variously situated LGBTQ2+ parents, 
and yet my conclusions were essentially the same as those in my afdavit 
98 2006 CanLII 19053 (Ont Sup Ct J) [Rutherford ]. 
99 2016 ONSC 3434 (Ont Sup Ct J). 




Copyright © 2020 Emond Montgomery Publications. All Rights Reserved. 
for Rutherford. I conducted a decade’s worth of research all to fnd the same 
things I had concluded ten years prior on the basis of my frst study in the 
feld. I appreciate now that sometimes it is necessary to say the same thing 
in diferent ways—that is, to repeatedly draw attention to diferent dimen-
sions of the problem—until the moment comes when the right kind of 
policy window opens and policy-makers are ready to hear your message. 
C. Understand Your Place in the Process 
As someone whose career is largely based on the production of knowledge, 
I hold research evidence in high regard. Before participating in LGBTQ2+ 
equality litigation, I found it puzzling and frustrating that producing rigorous 
research evidence was insufcient to produce policy change. Now, I appre-
ciate that research evidence is but one piece of the very complex puzzle that 
is policy-making. While the research I produce can provide important support
to an LGBTQ2+ equality case, through both drawing attention to the problem
and ofering policy solutions, what is needed for movement in the political 
stream are the stories of those directly afected by the issue at hand. Indi-
viduals’ direct experiences of inequality are, and should be, the key factor 
that motivates decision-makers to change policies in ways that improve the 
lives of LGBTQ2+, and other socially marginalized, people. As a researcher, 
I can play an important role in documenting those experiences in situating 
them in their social, historical, and political context, and in giving them 
credibility in circles where certain voices are privileged over others. Still, this 
work is only efective in changing policy when it occurs alongside LGBTQ2+ 
individuals doing the difcult work of putting forward their personal stories 
for the purposes of litigation. 
Participating in LGBTQ2+ equality litigation has been a great privilege 
for me. I am grateful for the opportunity to learn more about the policy-
making process, and to see work I have done produce concrete change for 
communities I care about. I look forward to being ready when the next 
policy window. 
